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YOU AND ME BABY AIN’T NOTHING BUT MAMMALS. 
SUBJECT NATURALISM AND DEFAULT POSITIONS1 
 




Este artículo discute el problema de la localización, tal como Price lo ha definido. En 
el se distinguen diferentes versiones de naturalismo y se defiende el naturalismo del 
sujeto. Se asume que el sistema de conceptos humano se ha desarrollado en 
interacción con el medio natural y social. Por esta razón no podemos evitar ser 
realistas y representacionalistas por defecto. Las afirmaciones básicas del realismo, el 
representatcionalismo y la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia son difícilmente 
rechazables, y esto explica el aire de artificiosidad que acompaña a las posiciones anti-
realistas. Sin embargo las posiciones por defecto no apoyan en absoluto a sus 
versiones filosóficamente desarrolladas. Estas son incompatibles con una visión 
naturalista sobre la realidad, el significado y la verdad. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Correspondentismo por defecto, naturalismo, naturalismo del 
sujeto, realismo por defecto, representacionalismo por defecto, teoría de la verdad 
como correspondencia, teoría prooracional de la verdad, verdad aristotélica 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with Price’s placement problem. In it, different versions of 
naturalism are distinguished and subject naturalism is defended. It is assumed that 
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and social surroundings. For this reason, we cannot but be realist and 
representationalist by default. The basis claims of realism, representationalism, and 
correspondence are hardly deniable, and this explains the artificiality scent that usually 
accompanies anti-realist positions. Nevertheless, the natural default positions do not 
lend any support to their philosophically implemented versions, metaphysical realism, 
semantic representationalism and full-blood correspondence. These approaches to 
reality, meaning and truth are incompatible with a sound naturalist stand on these 
issues. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotelian truth, correspondence theory of truth, default realism, 
default representationalism, default correspondentism, naturalism, prosentential 
theory of truth, subject naturalism.  
 
 
1. NATURALISM, WHICH NATURALISM? 
Standard philosophical naturalism is the view that science matters to 
philosophy, or as Price puts it, “the view that natural science constrains 
philosophy” (2004, p. 71). The ways in which it matters or the features that 
science constrains might give rise to different kinds of naturalism, which are 
sometimes taken as (i) the claim that (good, respectable) philosophy melt into 
one of the natural sciences (Quine, 1981, p. 72), sometimes as (ii) the claim 
that philosophy is a continuum with sciences, and still some other times as (iii) 
the claim that the propositions that philosophy puts forward and the 
procedures it relies on have to be compatible with the content and 
methodologies of the sciences.  Price calls (i) “object naturalism”. For clarity I 
will dub it “reductionist object naturalism”, and introduce “non-reductionist 
object naturalism” to cover (ii). Reductionist object naturalism aims at 
substituting one discipline (philosophy in general, epistemology, semantics, 
etc.) for another (physics, psychology, cognitive sciences, etc.). This implies 
that all concepts are in one way or another first-order empirical concepts, i.e., 
concepts that represent properties of physical objects. Non-reductionist object 
naturalism preserves an independent domain for philosophy. Both kinds 
constrain the topic and objects with which philosophy is allowed to deal, and if 
conflict arises, naturalism prescribes that philosophy should give way (since 
“science takes the lead”, Price, 2004, p. 71). Although Quine has defended 
You and me baby ain’t nothing but mammals. Subject naturalism and default positions 	  
Análisis. Revista de Investigación filosófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014 
 
 |43 
object naturalism in its two versions (Quine, loc. cit; Haack, 2009, p. 170 ff.), 
his name is linked with the reductionist kind thanks to his defence of empirical 
psychology as the scientific substitute for epistemology. Haack’s 
foundherentism, on the other hand, which illustrates the structure of the web 
of knowledge by continuist metaphors such as the crossword puzzle and the 
map, is a case of non-reductionist object naturalism. She presents her 
alternative to the positivist model of the structure of knowledge as follows: 
 
Rather than reduction, in the strong sense, there is integration of the social 
with the natural sciences. The Logical positivist’s strong, simple, conception 
of the way all the truth about the world must fit together has obscured an 
otherwise obvious fact: heterogeneous truth are no less true, nor necessarily 
disjointed, for their heterogeneity. A better model might be a map in which a 
depiction of the roads, towns, etc., is superimposed on a delineation of the 
contours of the same territory.” (Haack, 2007, p. 161) 
 
And two years later, she writes: 
 
The model is not, as a foundationalist’s might be, how one determines the 
soundness or otherwise of a mathematical proof; it is, rather, how one 
determines the reasonableness or otherwise of entries in a crossword puzzle. 
This model is more hospitable to a gradational account. But the main 
motivation is that the crossword model permits pervasive mutual support, 
rather than, like the model of a mathematical proof, encouraging an 
essentially one-directional conception. (Haack, 2009, p.126) 
  
Kind (iii) is naturalistic compatibilism, which has versions that fall 
under a liberal reading of object naturalism, but also admits interpretations 
close to Price’s subject naturalism (2004, p. 73). The contention that 
philosophical propositions, or philosophical activity in general, should be 
compatible with the precepts of natural sciences implies that philosophy 
cannot lend support to ideas that directly or indirectly contradict the 
background and findings of other scientific disciplines. Incompatible ideas are, 
for instance, that human beings survive death, or that the future of people is 
written in the stars. Subject naturalism, in turn, indicates an attitude about us; it 
is a background position: if we humans belong to the natural world (and how 
could we not), the knowledge we claim to possess cannot require abilities that 
exceed our natural capabilities. Or more precisely, the ways to knowledge 
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reclaimed by philosophy in order to sustain or justify its views cannot go 
beyond the kind of animal that science says we are. A declaration of subject 
naturalism is Peirce’s opposition to Cartesianism, in “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities”. According to Peirce, 
 
1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external 
facts. 
2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically 
by previous cognitions. 
3. We have no power of thinking without signs. 
4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. (1868b, p. 140) 
 
Thus, “certain Faculties claimed for Man” (see Peirce, 1868a) are not 
supported by scientific evidence. Against Cartesianism, which begins with 
universal doubt, and Scholasticism, which acknowledges absolute truths, Peirce 
advices “not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our 
hearts” (loc. cit.); a conspicuous avowal of naturalism. 
And now the next pair of labels: “object compatibilism”, for the first 
type of compatibilism, and “subject compatibilism”, for the second type. 
Compatibilism, in all its versions, is the aspiration of some coherentist 
approaches to knowledge. Object naturalism, on the other hand, is what lies 
beneath the standard versions of empiricist foundationalism.  
I endorse subject compatibilism, and as I cannot see any difference 
between this position and Price’s subject naturalism, I will adopt Price’s label. 
Being a background position is right in declaring subject naturalism to be more 
fundamental than “its most popular contemporary manifestation” (2004, p. 
72), object naturalism. 
Besides object and subject types, naturalism can also be 
methodological: in the pursuit of its aims, philosophy should proceed as 
sciences do. Alleged methods of knowledge acquisition or justification 
procedures such as intuition or subjective, non-communicable certainty should 
be forbidden. Methodological naturalism also admits alternative versions: it can 
be seen either as an independent claim on the acceptability of justification 
methods, or as an aspect of subject naturalism. According to the different 
scientific theories, the animals we are acquire the knowledge and skills that 
have enabled our survival by routes that have proved to be evolutionary 
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successful. If philosophy claims to produce knowledge, its ways of doing so 
need to be in accordance with those procedures that science has sanctioned as 
humanly suitable. 
Needless to say, all these positions are artificially distinguished, and 
only vaguely characterized. Terms like “continuous” or “compatible” usually 
convey only intuitions and images. What does it mean that philosophy should 
be compatible with science? And more pointedly, how do we know? Besides, 
any naturalist could conceivably be classified under more than one of these 
labels. For instance, Haack also seems at times close to subject naturalism. 
“Still, we humans are animals”, she claims in (2007, p. 156), and continues: 
“biological facts certainly constrain what social arrangements are humanly 
possible” (loc. cit.).  
Nevertheless, the customary nonchalant use of labels such as 
“naturalism”, “realism”, “representationalism”, and many others often leads 
debates that reach dead ends. It is thus crucial to show that the prevailing 
association between naturalism and scientific reductionisms is not unavoidable. 
In the following pages I will elaborate on subject naturalism and isolate 
the intuitions on which naturalist and non-naturalist representationalism rest. I 
will argue that realism and representationalism are our positions by default. 
Metaphysical realism and semantic representationalism, their philosophically 
implemented versions, are nevertheless untenable both for philosophical and 
naturalistic reasons. Acknowledging the weaknesses of semantic 
representationalism does not require sophisticated, nonstandard stances on 
language; it suffices to pay attention to some basic intuitions, which I take to 
be empirical, stressed by some of the more prominent philosophers of 
language of the last century.  
2. THE ROOTS OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 
As Price characterizes the situation, standard naturalists, i.e. 
reductionist object naturalists, and their non-naturalist critics all share a 
semantic presupposition (2004, p. 72): a representationalist approach to 
meaning. Most proposals that have had any influence in the philosophy of 
language in the past century have been classified as representationalist, at least 
in their standard interpretations. If it were shown that the presupposition is 
groundless, the contenders on both sides of the debate would suffer the same 
fate, and be left without their semantic premise in one blow. The core of 
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representationalism is the intuition that having a meaning is an issue of 
depicting state-of-affairs. The depiction can range from the most naïve 
interpretation, as in some readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, to the 
sophisticated kind that supports Austin’s definition of truth (Austin, 1950) or 
Situation Semantics (Barwise & Perry, 1983 passim). Contemporary 
contextualism embraces representationalism as well, so that not in vain 
Recanati’s approach to meaning is known as Truth Conditional Pragmatics (see 
Reacanati, 2010), in allusion to truth conditional semantics, which in its 
classical versions is a paradigm of representationalism. Strictly speaking, truth 
conditional semantics can be supported from representationalist as well as 
from non-representationalist accounts of language, but in the last century the 
representationalist interpretation has been dominant. All representationalist 
approaches assume that to say something is to identify an entity of which the 
speaker predicates a property. The two basic speech acts are thus referring to 
and describing. Asserting is then the combination of the two, referring-cum-
describing.  
A powerful analogy that illustrates the representational intuitions that 
standard naturalists and non-naturalists have in common is Price’s matching 
game: 
 
Imagine a child’s puzzle book, arranged like this. The left-hand page contains 
a large sheet of peel-off stickers, and the right-hand page shows a line drawing 
of a complex scene. For each sticker – the koala, the boomerang, the Sydney 
Opera House, and so on – the reader needs to find the unique outline in the 
drawing with the corresponding shape. The aim of the game is to place all the 
stickers in their correct locations, in this sense. 
Now think of the right-hand page as the world, and the stickers as the 
collection of all the statements we take to be true of the world. For each such 
statement, it seems natural to ask what makes it true; what fact in the world 
has precisely the corresponding “shape”. Within the scope of this simple but 
intuitive analogy, matching true statements to the world seems a lot like 
matching stickers to the line drawing. (Price, 2011, p. 3) 
 
The matching game identifies saying, predicating, and referring. All of 
them entail the task of placing stickers in their matching shapes. The matching 
game illustrates the “placement problem” (Price, 2011, pp. 3-6). 
Representationalism never walks alone. It systematically comes in 
packages that include other semantic positions together with a variety of 
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metaphysical theses. Thus, when meaning is representing, truth becomes 
representational success. A sentence is true if, and only if, things are as 
depicted in the sentence. This is the basic claim of the theory of truth as 
correspondence. Representationalism and correspondence are steady 
companions. Austin’s definition of truth leaves no doubt about the 
connections between representationalism and the correspondence theory of 
truth: 
 
And finally (for present purposes-of-course there are other conditions to be 
satisfied too) there must be two sets of conventions: – 
 
Descriptive conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with the types of 
situation, thing, event, etc., to be found in the world. 
 
Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (= statements) with the 
historic situations, etc., to be found in the world. 
 
A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is 
correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it "refers") is 
of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the 
descriptive conventions. (Austin, 1950, p. 5) 
 
The connections here are so close that Strawson’s main criticism 
against Austin’s definition is that it has blurred the distinctions entirely 
(Strawson, 1950, p. 22).  
Representationalism-cum-correspondence can be complemented to 
become either a naturalist or a non-naturalist general position, depending on 
the theses included in the package. A reductionist metaphysical thesis about 
what there is will convert representationalism-cum-correspondence into 
reductionist object naturalism. In these positions, truth applies only to 
sentences on the designated level, the level that so to say is in contact with the 
world (ordinary empirical discourse, the language of physics, the language of 
empirical psychology, or any other preferred alternative). The truth of 
sentences on other levels is derivative, and implies translation into sentences 
on the designated level. Radical empiricism is an example of reductionist object 
naturalism.  
A non-naturalist extension of representationalism-cum-correspondence 
is metaphysical realism. Here, placement problems, those illustrated by Price’s 
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matching game, are solved by populating the world, by “engrossing” (as Price 
says, 2011, p. 3) the number of outlines on the right-hand page. Thus, if the 
outlines on the right-hand page are predetermined and essentially fewer in 
number than the stickers on the left-hand page, we play the reductionist 
(object naturalist) game. If, on the contrary, we are allowed to draw as many 
outlines as we need in order to use up all the stickers, we play the metaphysical 
realist game. Object naturalism thus presupposes a representational theory of 
meaning for those parcels of discourse that natural science and philosophy 
manage together, whereas realism implies universal representationalism 
covering assertive discourse in general. 
Representationalism is the crux of the matter, as Price rightly stresses. 
Even philosophers that lead the pragmatic turn in the philosophy of language 
in the second half of the past century adhere to representationalism as their 
general theory of meaning. The famous dispute between Austin and Strawson 
on truth, mentioned above, exposes with disconcerting clarity the 
contradictions concealed in the representational kind of pragmatism that both 
authors profess. Strawson endorses Austin’s representationalism while at the 
same time confronts him with the simplest and therefore maximally damaging 
version of the placement problem. Here are the two texts: 
 
My central objection to Mr. Austin's thesis is this. He describes the conditions 
which must obtain if we are correctly to declare a statement true. His detailed 
description of these conditions is, with reservations, correct as far as it goes, though in 
several respects too narrow (Strawson, 1950, p. 22, my italics) 
 
Consider the simplest of these cases, that involving negation. With what type 
of state-of-affairs (chunk of reality) is the sentence "The cat is not on the 
mat" correlated by conventions of description? With a mat simpliciter? With a 
dog on a mat? With a cat up a tree? The amendment of Mr. Austin's view to 
which one might be tempted for negative statements (i.e., "S is true" = "The 
state of affairs to which S is correlated by the demonstrative conventions is 
not of a type with which the affirmative form of S is correlated by the 
descriptive conventions") destroys the simplicity of the story by creating the 
need for a different sense of "true" when we discuss negative statements. 
(Strawson, 1950, p. 21). 
 
In fact, the “amendment” which Strawson attributes to Austin shows 
that Austin’s correspondentism is what I will call “default correspondentism”. 
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In this text, Strawson reminds Austin that not all kinds of statements can be 
analysed as involving demonstrative and descriptive conventions; that for 
negative, but also general, existential, hypothetical, and disjunctive sentences 
the account does not work (Strawson, 1950, p. 22). And Austin answers by 
diluting his view into a truism. Now, Austin should not need to be reminded. 
He is well aware of the non-descriptive role of some concepts when he claims: 
 
It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in 
apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd 
additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the 
circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is 
subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like. To overlook these 
possibilities in the way once common is called the 'descriptive' fallacy; but 
perhaps this is not a good name, as 'descriptive' itself is special. Not all true or 
false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word 
'Constative'. Along these lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or at least 
made to look likely, that many traditional philosophical perplexities have 
arisen through a mistake—the mistake of taking as straightforward statements 
of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) 
nonsensical or else intended as something quite different (Austin, 1962, p. 3).   
 
This situation manifests that the roots of representationalism are 
deeper than what is explicitly recognized. At the same time, a 
representationalist approach to key topics in metaphysics, philosophy of 
language, and philosophy of logic, topics such as meaning, reference, truth, 
existence, and validity, has proved to be highly inoperative. Williams, for 
instance, declares that “[t]he  view that this book is concerned to defend is that 
most of these theories and problems are the result of an inadequate 
appreciation of the way in which ‘be’, ‘true, and ‘same’ work (Williams, 1992, p. 
ix). For the case of truth, see (Frápolli 2013, passim).  
By rejecting representationalism, Price opposes object naturalism and 
non-naturalism alike (2004, p. 73), and proposes the following “Invalidity 
Thesis”, [IT]:  
 
[IT] “There are strong reasons for doubting whether object naturalism 
deserves to be ‘validated’ — whether its presuppositions do survive 
subject naturalist scrutiny” (Price, 2004, p. 74). 
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Price stresses that subject naturalism does not support object 
naturalism, but rather the opposite. A conscious subject naturalist would 
understand object naturalism as undefendable. 
I accept [IT] and reject representationalism altogether. However, given 
that representationalism is the first theory that comes to mind on beginning to 
think about meaning, then subject naturalism should offer an explanation of its 
pervasiveness. In the following sections I will argue that there is a coherent 
narrative that explains why representationalism is accepted so easily, a narrative 
that supports Price’s intuition about the troublesome coexistence of subject 
and (reductionist) object kinds of naturalism.  
3. DEFAULT POSITIONS  
Humans cannot help being (default) realists, (default) 
representationalists and, given the structure and functioning of natural 
languages, (default) correspondentists. In what follows, I will argue that their 
philosophically implemented namesake cousins cannot grow from the 
presuppositions assumed by the default positions. 
The physical world we have access to through the senses is an 
automatic assumption of natural creatures, not a conscious decision on our 
part. This is “default realism” (Frápolli, in press), and it is what should be 
expected if subject naturalism is taken seriously. Default realism is a 
spontaneous attitude, not a toy version of metaphysical realism with its 
theoretical assumptions reduced to a minimum. My belief that there is a 
computer in front of me, that my car is in the garage even if I cannot see it at 
this moment, that the scene (which I see from my office) of my son doing his 
homework in the living room is not a whimsical product of my mind, are not 
reached after any inferential process. We do not doubt these types of situations 
“in our hearts” (Peirce, loc. cit). Metaphysical realism is something else. It is 
the elaborate philosophical position that regards human beings in contrast with 
their natural environment, the view that distinguishes two antagonistic kinds of 
substances, res extensa and res cogitants, with irreconcilable properties and 
behaviour, and ruled by different sets of laws. It is the philosophical position 
that welcomes the sceptic to find the way between mind and world. If we 
humans had any justification to develop the extremely cautious attitude by 
which metaphysical realism deals with the experience of the external world and 
other minds, then our instinctive confidence concerning what we see and 
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touch would be utterly irrational. Thus, whereas default realism is the natural 
attitude, the accommodation of metaphysical realism in the evolutionary 
history of our species is far from trivial. The default position is what 
Wittgenstein’s aphorisms convey: 
 
109. “An empirical proposition can be tested” (we say). But how? And 
through what? 
 
110. What counts as its test? – “But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must 
it not be recognizable as such in logic?” – As if giving grounds did not come 
to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition:  it is 
an ungrounded way of acting (Wittgenstein, 1969) 
 
Default realism cannot be proved, but it cannot be rejected, either. 
Nothing that can be said will settle the debate between metaphysical realism 
and the kind of pragmatism detectable in Wittgenstein’s text. No argument can 
silence the sceptic definitively; for once we recognize metaphysical realism as a 
meaningful opponent, we get trapped in the fly bottle. Default realism explains 
why metaphysical realism is so engaging, even though default realism lends no 
support to metaphysical realism. 
In a similar sense, there is default representationalism, which is the 
semantic face of default realism. It is the natural reaction that makes children 
say “mum” in front of their mothers, and “water” in front of transparent 
liquids. The basic speech acts described by Wittgenstein in the first paragraphs 
of Philosophical Investigations (see for instance § 1, §6, and §8) illustrate the gist of 
the representational view. If one asks somebody to bring this block here, we 
cannot doubt at the same time that there is a block there and that the word 
“block” is somehow related to bricks. Wittgenstein’s resource to the notion of 
language game in Philosophical Investigations (PI) is precisely a manner to insist in 
that this elementary behaviour fails to explain the functioning of language: 
 
It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition that one should 
imagine anything in connexion with it, than that one should make a sketch 
from it. (PI, § 396) 
Instead of “imaginability” one can also say here: representability by a 
particular method of representation. And such a representation may indeed 
safely point a way to further use of a sentence. On the other hand a picture 
may obtrude itself upon us and be of no use at all. (PI, § 397). 
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There is a multiplicity of language games that humans can play and 
refuse to play, we can play the philosophy game, or play chess, and we can play 
the ethics game or the political game. But not every decision is at hand; we 
cannot help playing the default realist game, since playing it is part of what 
being rational animals means. And the same happens with default 
representationalism: playing the representationalist game is a natural reaction 
related to specific speech acts with empirical content. The representational 
game loses its trivial aspect, however, as soon as we engage in speech acts with 
higher degrees of abstractness. Consider the following pair of sentences, 
uttered in appropriate contexts: 
 
[1] Joan seeks his mobile phone in the car, and 
[2] The European Community seeks peace in the Middle East. 
 
Representationalism would diagnose that [1] and [2] admit an 
analogous semantic analysis, as they both depict state-of-affairs in a way or 
another. The perplexities prompted by the similarities and differences of [1] 
and [2] are well known. Benacerraf, for instance, examined them for the 
specific case of mathematical statements: 
 
It is my contention that two quite distinct kinds of concerns have separately 
motivated accounts of the nature of mathematical truth: (1) the concern for 
having a homogeneous semantical theory in which semantics for the 
propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for the rest of the 
language, and (2) the concern that the account of mathematical truth mesh 
with a reasonable epistemology. It will be my general thesis that almost all 
accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified with serving 
one or another of these masters at the expense of the other. (Benacerraf 1973, 
661) 
 
The situation that Benacerraf explains remains unaltered if the focus is 
extended to non-empirical contents of any kind. The two horns of Benacerraf’s 
dilemma for the case of abstract propositions such as [2] are (i) either 
maintaining the same semantic analysis that we commonly apply to [1] and 
then having to offer a nonstandard epistemic explanation concerning when 
You and me baby ain’t nothing but mammals. Subject naturalism and default positions 	  
Análisis. Revista de Investigación filosófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014 
 
 |53 
and how [2] can be asserted, or (ii) offering a nonstandard semantic 
explanation of [2] that makes its epistemological treatment easier.  
Focusing on practices explains the differences in behaviour of [1] and 
[2] and offers a way out of Benacerraf’s dilemma. Practices are the bedrock 
facts. Option (i) would imply that the contents of [1] and [2] would perform 
similar communicative roles. Nevertheless, the circumstances in which we 
would be entitled to assert [1] are not the circumstances in which we would be 
entitled to assert [2]. Despite their grammatical similarities, a successful use of 
[1] will express a singular proposition that concerns physical entities, Joan, his 
mobile phone, and a car, whereas [2] will convey a general proposition with 
highly indirect connections with physical objects, if any. And the same happens 
with the consequences of the respective assertions. The commitments acquired 
by the utterance of [1] in the appropriate circumstances are not the 
commitments acquired by the agent of an act of asserting [2]. The sticker-
matching game is easier in the case of [1] than in the case of [2]. The 
application conditions of some assertions include reference to aspects of the 
surrounding nature. Meanwhile [1], used in appropriate contexts, might be 
explained by reference to physical objects, although much more theory is 
required to infer from this either that the content of assertive acts mirrors 
particular configurations of objects in the world, or that all concepts possess 
application conditions that relate them to particular physical objects or their 
properties. Assertions for which the application conditions are partly empirical 
possibly constitute the simplest kind of speech act, and they might have both 
chronological and logical priority in the development of language. This 
explains the prevalence of the representationalist approach, its default 
character, but it fails to justify representationalism as a general theory of 
meaning. Option (ii) would imply the lack of a unified account of language. 
Representationalism and realism, in their philosophically developed 
versions, are dualist approaches in which mind and language contrast with 
something else, be it states-of-affairs, the world, reality or anything else. A 
naturalistic explanation of meaning should, on the other hand, integrate 
humans into their environment. To escape Benacerraf’s dilemma, a non-
reductionist position able to restore the unity of mind and world is required, a 
position capable of closing the gap that realists and representationalists alike 
insist on opening artificially. A pragmatist approach can do the job. 
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The supply of pragmatism2 indispensable for a naturalist explanation of 
meaning includes acceptance of some basic principles that should not disturb 
any educated philosopher. One of these is the priority of assertion, [PA], 
 
[PA] The simplest meaningful speech act is one in which agents put 
forward a propositional content that they endorse. 
 
[PA] is detectable in all pragmatists. Brandom, for instance, is the latest 
philosopher to argue for assertions as language downtown (Brandom, 1994, p. 
83), but [PA] has been a constant since Kant, at least. Also, [PA] stands at the 
origin of modern logic, as the Fregean Principle of Context shows: “Never to 
ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a 
proposition (see Frege 1884, Introduction, p. x).  
A second intuition that weighs pragmatism against representationalism 
is the way in which propositions are individuated. The representationalist 
method brings in the placement problem, the problem illustrated by Price’s 
matching game, in full, since it individuates propositions according to the state-
of-affairs (ingredients-plus-configuration) that they mirror. An alternative 
consists of individuating them by the role they perform connecting some acts 
with some others: the content of an act of assertion is identified by the 
inferences that go from the entitlements an agent has to possess in order to 
successfully perform it and the consequences to which the agent gets 
committed by the performance. “The link between pragmatic significance and 
inferential content”, Brandom says, “is supplied by the fact that asserting a 
sentence is implicitly undertaking a commitment to the correctness of the 
material inference from its circumstances to its consequences of application” 
(Brandom, 2000, p. 63). And explains that “the content to which one is 
committed by using the concept or expression may be represented by the 
inference one implicitly endorses by such use, the inference, namely, from the 
circumstances of appropriate employment to the appropriate consequences of 
such employment” (Brandom, 2000, p. 62). Different sets of entitlements and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Pragmatism turns into pragmatics when applied to the theory of meaning. An approach is 
pragmatic, in the technical sense of the philosophy of language, if it makes room to contextual 
factors in the characterization of meaning. I will not distinguish between pragmatism and 
pragmatics, as my argument in this paper does not require it. I consider pragmatism the view 
that takes communicative practices as both the ultimate bedrock for any theoretical work on 
language and also the phenomena to be explained. 
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commitments characterize different kinds of contents, some of them with 
empirical conditions and some others without them. Inferences do not require 
“placements”; they are moves in the continuous activity that comprises 
humans’ communicative behaviour. This Brandomian terminology should not 
obscure the triviality of the claim, which implies that the content of a concept 
such as “wet” includes among its application conditions its connection to wet 
things. But this is not enough. In order to attribute to an agent the possession 
of the concept, one has to be sure that the agent understands the inferential 
relations between it and other concepts such humid (implication) and dry 
(incompatibility). Let us call this intuition, Minimal Inferentialism [MI], 
 
[MI] Possessing a concept means to be able to apply it in successful 
speech acts and to draw some elemental consequences from its 
application. 
 
The question of whether concepts such as value, meaning, or truth can 
or cannot be explained within naturalism is. from the viewpoint of subject 
naturalism, nonsense (of course, they can, how could they not?). If by using those 
concepts we humans perform actions that are recognizable by other humans, 
with an effect in communication and an identifiable function, then these 
concepts are by definition suitable for a naturalist treatment. Pragmatism has 
to explain how these concepts work in a natural system of concepts but not 
whether they work. The difficulty for the theorist is to offer an explanation that 
does not defy our nature as social animals. And the answer has to proceed by 
looking at the kind of actions in which the concepts concerned are put to 
work. Meanings are accounted for by appealing to the practices in which 
agents are involved when they use particular concepts, by their use of particular 
concepts or because they have used particular concepts. These practices typically 
relate agents to other agents and their surroundings and are describable in 
public, naturalistic terms. 
3. ARISTOTELIAN TRUTH 
Finally, there is also default correspondentism. Aristotle famously 
declared that “to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, 
while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” 
(Metaphysics 1011b25). Since then, most proponents of theories of truth have 
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vindicated Aristotle’s words as their inspiration; Tarski (1944, §1.3) and 
Ramsey (1927/1991, p. 11) are examples. The Aristotelian dictum has been 
systematically interpreted as a declaration of correspondentism: if we are 
willing to agree with Aristotle’s view on truth, then we most probably support 
a theory of truth as correspondence. But as it happens with default brands of 
realism and representationalism, default correspondentism, i.e. the Aristotelian 
view [AV], can be endorsed without adopting any commitment to a full-blown 
theory of truth as correspondence. This claim should be obvious from the fact 
that unsurmountable divergences arise as soon as philosophers try to develop 
their particular versions of [AV], which can be stated as follows: 
 
[AV] To say the truth is to say of what it is that it is. 
 
A semi-formal, more perspicuous version is [AV] semi-formal, 
 
[AV] semi-formal To say the truth is to say p when p. 
 
How could anyone reject that p, when p? [AV] expresses a grammatical 
truism that cannot be denied on pain of inconsistency. Expressions such as “it 
is true”, “the truth”, “how things are”, “the facts”, “it is so”, “it is a fact”, and 
many others are intra-linguistic resources to point to and pack together pieces 
of information, that range from singular propositions to the potentially infinite 
amount encoded by a theory (see Frapolli, 2013, ch. 3). These are schemas, as 
Wittgenstein explains in PI: 
 
Let us examine the proposition (“Satz”)3: “This is how things are.” — How 
can I say that this is the general form of the proposition? — It is first and 
foremost itself a proposition, an English sentence, for it has a subject and a 
predicate. But how is this sentence applied — that is, in our everyday 
language? For I got it from there and nowhere else. 
 We may say, e.g.: “He explained his position to me, said that this was 
how things were, and that therefore he needed an advance”. So far, then, one 
can say that that sentence stands for any statement. It is employed as a 
propositional schema, but only because it has the construction of an English 
sentence. It would be possible to say instead “such and such is the case”, “this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Here “Satz” means sentence. We reserve the term “proposition” for the contents of some 
sentences in assertive speech acts. 
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is the situation”, and so on. It would also be possible here simple to use a 
letter, a variable, as in symbolic logic. But no one is going to call the letter “p” 
the general form of propositions. To repeat: “This is how things are” had that 
position only because it is itself what one calls an English sentence. But 
though it is a proposition, still it gets employed as a propositional variable. To 
say that this proposition agrees (or does not agree) with reality would be 
obvious nonsense. Thus it illustrates the fact that one feature of our concept 
of a proposition is, sounding like a proposition (IP§ 134). 
 
The entities referred to by expressions such as “the facts” and “the 
truth” or the contents expressed by sentences such as “this is how things are” 
are propositions, i.e. conceptual complexes. Strawson clearly understood their 
role:  
 
Facts are known, stated, learnt, forgotten, overlooked, commented on, 
communicated or noticed. (Each of these verbs may be followed by a "that"-
clause or a "the fact that"-clause.) Facts are what statements (when true) state; 
they are not what statements are about (1950, p. 7) 
Verbs that admit that-clauses codify concepts whose arguments are or 
include concepts. This does not preclude those verbs from occurring in 
constructions with a singular term as the subject. Both “this is a fact” and “this 
is a car” are correct English sentences, but in spite of the obvious surface 
similarities, “this” in each case performs a markedly different role. If an 
interlocutor replied “which car?” surely the answer should be different from 
the answer one would give if asked “which fact?”. In this latter case, the 
response must offer a propositional content: the fact that right-wing politics 
have led Southern European countries to bankruptcy. What statements convey 
are propositions, while propositions we endorse we call “facts”. “Is a fact” is 
then a predicate of propositional contents, of entities capable of bearing a 
truth-value. Frege supports this position in Begriffsschrift: 
 
We can imagine a language in which the proposition “Archimedes perished at 
the capture of Syracuse” would be expressed thus: “The violent death of 
Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse is a fact”. To be sure, one can 
distinguish between subject and predicate here, too, if one wishes to do so, 
but the subject contains the whole content, and the predicate serves only to 
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turn the content into a judgement. Such a language would have only a single 
predicate for all judgements, namely, “is a fact”. We see that there cannot be 
any suggestion here of subject and predicate in the ordinary sense. Our 
ideography is a language of this sort, and in it the sign ├ is the common 
predicate for all judgements. (Frege, 1879, pp. 12-3) 
 
That expressions such as “is true” and “is a fact” perform the same 
function do not impede them from presenting stylistic deviations. This is 
something that Strawson also knew: 
 
It would indeed be wrong – but not for Mr. Austin's reasons – to identify 
"fact" and "true statement"; for these expressions have different ro ̂les in our 
language, as can be seen by the experiment of trying to interchange them in 
context. Nevertheless their roles – or those of related expressions – overlap. 
There is no nuance, except of style, between "That's true" and "That's a fact"; 
nor between "Is it true that...?" and "Is it a fact that...?" (Strawson, 1950, p. 7) 
Formal discrepancies between “true” and “fact” sustain those positions 
that see them as expressing distinguishable concepts and thus see their 
combination as explicative. It is advisable, in these cases, not to confuse terms 
with their contents. Consider the following pair of sentences, [3] and [4], 
 
[3] That Archimedes died at the capture of Syracuse is a fact, 
[4] “Archimedes perished at the capture of Syracuse” expresses a true 
proposition. 
 
Both are well-formed English sentences. If we exchange the 
occurrences of “a fact” and “expresses a true proposition” in them, the result 
will be the strange sentences, [5] and [6], 
 
[5] That Archimedes died at the capture of Syracuse expresses a true 
proposition, 
[6] “Archimedes perished at the capture of Syracuse” is a fact. 
 
Quotation marks are a linguistic convention for mention; when they 
are used, expressions, and not their contents, are highlighted. By means of 
expressions, agents express propositional and non-propositional contents. 
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“Fact”, on the other hand, makes no reference to expressions but rather help 
to endorse propositions, and hence the awkward effect that their combination 
produces. “That”, in turn, is a device for propositional designation; it 
introduces propositions which are abstract entities, the contents of what is 
said, assumed, rejected, doubted, etc. and the bearers of logical properties, 
implication, and incompatibility. Expressions transmit contents and are 
linguistic entities with syntactic and semantic properties but without logical 
properties. This explains that the combination of “expresses” and “that” 
produces interferences due to their different range of application. Thus, even 
though “truth” and “fact” perform the same logical role, their occurrence 
together with other linguistic and conceptual tools not always produce the 
same results from the standpoint of linguistic correctness. “Fact” and “true” 
express the same conceptual device, both apply to propositions that the agent 
endorses and both are means to deal with indeterminate amounts of 
information as a whole. Syntactically, they are used to convert designations of 
propositions, i.e. singular terms that denote propositions, into complete 
sentences that express ─ in an appropriate context ─ those propositions. It is a 
denominalizer (Horwich, 1998, p. 5). To maintain the terminological 
symmetry, we could then consider quotation marks and terms such as “that”, 
“the proposition that”, and the like as nominalizers, i.e., functions whose 
arguments are expressions of propositions and whose values are designations 
of them. Putting the two functions together in an equivalence sentence, as 
typically occurs in the standard formulations of the theory of truth as 
correspondence, only gives rise to analytic sentences. The position on truth 
that derives from these grammatical remarks is “Default Correspondentism”, a 
standard formulation of which is [DC], 
 
[DC] Something is true if, and only if, it is a fact. 
[DC] is analytically true and neither implies nor supports its 
metaphysically inflated versions. Being analytic, nothing substantive can follow 
from it. 
The standard formulations of correspondence, [DC] among them, are 
somewhat tricky. “Something” and “it” are variables, proforms, anaphorically 
linked. Depending on their substitution instances, [DC] will produce either 
trivial grammatical remarks or weird combinations such as [7], [8], [9] and [10], 
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[7] A sentence is true if, and only if, it is a fact, 
[8] An event is true if, and only if, it is a fact, 
[9] A proposition is true if, and only if, it is a fact, 
[10] A state-of-affairs is true if, and only if, it is a fact. 
 
It sounds odd to say that sentences are facts. With propositions, the 
equivalence is easier to accept in one direction (If a proposition is true then it is a 
fact) and sounds nonsensical in the converse (If a proposition is a fact then it is true). 
Events or states-of-affairs are meant to be physical complexes, whereas truth is 
said of abstract entities. In [DC] the terms “something” and “it” are 
indeterminate enough to allow (and hide) some kind of equivocation and thus, 
some of its instances — [7] -[10] for example— display category mistakes: true 
sentences do not fall within the application domain of “is a fact”, events 
cannot be said to be true or false, etc. More acceptable are the following 
sentences, [11] and [12], 
 
[11] True sentences express facts, 
[12] True propositions are facts, 
 
In any case, as variations on instances of [DC], [11]-[12] are as empty as 
their weird cousins [7]-[10] are.  
If [DC] represents the grain of truth that lends support to the different 
versions of correspondence theories, [12] displays the correct intuition that 
supports identity theories of truth.  Nevertheless, neither correspondence nor 
identity theories of truth gain ground on their own accord. They are both 
elaborations of correct, although merely grammatical, intuitions to which the 
proponents of these positions ascribe a theoretical weight that they do not 
possess. 
In short, the appeal of correspondentist claims, such as the Aristotelian 
dictum, has a simple explanation: it depends on certain grammatical features of 
natural languages. Particularly, it derives from the job of locutions such as “it is 
a fact” and “it is true” as complex propositional variables. Phrases such as “it is 
true”, “you are right” or “it is a fact” are the kind of linguistic tool that agents 
use to indirectly assert and endorse propositional contents. The conjoint 
occurrence of “true” and “fact” in sentences such as [11] and [12] transmits the 
impression that the sentence cannot be used to say anything false. The 
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impression is correct, but the reason is not that they convey substantive 
necessary truths but rather that they lack any content whatsoever. [DC] makes 
only a grammatical remark that cannot give support to any significant 
metaphysical position. 
As in the cases of representationalism and realism, here too a perfectly 
trivial assumption is mistakenly interpreted as a solid philosophical position. 
From default correspondentism, nothing substantial follows about the alleged 
relationship between words and the world. In particular, it follows neither that 
truth is a relation, nor that true sentences share with portions of the world, 
their alleged truth-makers, their structure or configuration. 
A naturalist understanding of human beings is not jeopardized by these 
default positions. Default realism and default representationalism derive from 
subject naturalism, from what science says we are and how:we have evolved. 
Default correspondentism derives from the way in which our conceptual 
system, reflected in natural languages, has developed.  
4.  EXISTENCE, OBJECTIVITY, AND THE PLACEMENT PROBLEM 
The placement problem derives from representationalism, as Price 
points out. But representationalism is not its only cause. Two systematic 
conceptual conflations add confusion to the topic: the first one is the 
identification of existence with spatiotemporal location; and the second one is 
the understanding of objectivity as some kind of externality to the mind. 
Somehow the two notions, existence and objectivity, boil down to some kind 
of placement out-from-the-subject’s-mind. These two identifications are 
generalized, even though philosophers of logic and of language adhere without 
the slightest hesitation to the Fregean interpretation of numbers and 
quantifiers. And yet Frege’s position is clear: 
 
But, it will perhaps be objected, even if the Earth is really not imaginable; it is 
at any rate an external thing, occupying a definite place; but where is the 
number 4? It is neither outside us not within us. And, taking those words in 
their spatial sense, that is quite correct. To give spatial co-ordinates for the 
number 4 makes no sense; but the only conclusion to be drawn from that is, 
that 4 is not a spatial object, not that it is not an object at all. Not every object 
has a place. Even our ideas are in this sense not within us (beneath our skin); 
beneath the skin are nerve-ganglia, blood corpuscles and things of that sort, 
but not ideas. Spatial predicates are not applicable to them: an idea is neither 
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to the right nor to the left of another idea; we cannot give distances between 
ideas in millimetres. If we still say they are within us, then we intend by this to 
signify that they are subjective. 
Yet even granted that what is subjective has no position in space, how is it 
possible for the number 4, which is objective, not to be anywhere? Now I 
contend that there is no contradiction in this whatever. It is a fact that the 
number 4 is exactly the same for everyone who deals with it; but that has 
nothing to do with being spatial. Not every objective object has a place. 
(Frege, 1884 § 61) 
 
 
In the text just quoted, Frege implies that the pair of concepts internal 
vs. external, even when applied to ideas, has to be understood metaphorically. 
Neither ideas nor concepts are within us; they are not anywhere. Ideas, 
numbers and other concepts lack spatial properties altogether. Applying spatial 
predicates to them is to commit a category mistake, in Ryle’s sense 
(1949/2009, p. 8ff.). Metaphysical realism is thus the realm in which this 
category mistake is taken to its limits.  
The objectivity of mathematics against psychologism is Frege’s main 
concern. The first principle that guides his work on numbers is explicit: 
“always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective 
from the objective” (Austin’s translation, 1884, p. xxii). The essence of 
psychologism is the dependence of concepts on the individual mind. 
Psychologism at this point runs against our intuition, since even though the 
number four is not a physical object, it does not belong to anybody either. 
Frege’s response to the apparent paradox was to show that the dichotomy 
subjective vs. located is not exhaustive. To be objective, contents do not need 
to be located somewhere. Concepts, in general, and numbers, in particular, are 
neither subjective nor located. And they are nevertheless objective, their 
objectivity lying in the independence of their properties and relations from our 
will: 
 
That a statement of number should express something factual independent of 
our way of regarding things can surprise only those who think a concept is 
something subjective like an idea. But this is a mistaken view. If, for example, 
we bring the concept of body under that of what has weight, or the concept 
of whale under that of mammal, we are asserting something objective (1884, § 
47, p. 60) 
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And they certainly exist, their existence meaning their being 
instantiated:  
 
Existence is analogous to numbers. In this respect existence is analogous to 
number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number 
nought. (1884, §53, p. 65) 
 
Existence, for Frege, is a property of concepts, i.e. a higher-order 
concept. Spatial predicates, on the other hand, encode properties of physical 
objects, i.e. first-order concepts. We say that Joan’s mobile phone is in the car 
and that the North Star is in Ursa Minor. Nevertheless, when we claim that 
there are left-wing Europeans, we are not predicating anything of any localized 
European citizen, we are predicating something of the concept “left-wing 
European”: that is not empty. Higher-order concepts (such as truth, existence, 
knowledge) apply to other concepts, including propositions. By definition, 
their arguments do not have spatiotemporal localization, and thus higher-order 
concepts do not represent features or elements of situations or state-of-affairs. 
Even if we insisted on sticking to the representationalist view of meaning 
concerning names and first-order predicables, there are still reasons not to 
follow the same path concerning higher-order concepts. For 
representationalists, the sentence “the cat is on the mat” is able to describe any 
situation in which the ingredients include a cat, a mat, and the relation of being 
on (the cat, the mat), and “the dog is under the tree” is able to describe any 
situation with dog, a tree, and the relation of being under (the dog, the tree). 
But surely the type-situation that could be represented by the sentence “The 
cat is on the mat and the dog is under the tree” would not include more 
elements that the sum of the two type-situations related to each of its 
conjuncts. Conjunction is not an ingredient of situations, and the same is the 
case with reference and truth. The type-situations that representationalism 
relate with “That the cat is on the mat is true” and with “There is a cat on a 
mat” surely share all their ingredients with the type situation depicted by “The 
cat is on the mat”. Similarly, saying that “the cat” refers to the cat in a 
particular situation does not add a new component to the situation at hand. 
Reference, truth, fact, and also knowledge, belief, and any other higher order 
notions cannot be reduced to physical objects and properties. Their meaning is 
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seen in the functions they perform. Let us consider a few examples to clarify 
the point: 
 
[13] The analysis of the materials picked up on Mars in the latest 
NASA mission detects unequivocal traits of H2O of extra-terrestrial 
origin. 
[14] The cardinality of the set of real numbers is greater than the 
cardinality of the set of natural numbers. 
[15] To prepare Peking duck, you have to be an expert cook. 
 
Whoever sincerely asserts [13], becomes thereby committed to [16], 
 
[16] There is (or has been) water on Mars. 
 
If a speaker claimed [13] and at the same time rejected [16], we would 
be entitled to doubt the speaker’s understanding of the notions involved. 
By the same argument, whoever claimed [14] would have to accept 
[17], 
 
[17] There are transfinite numbers greater than ℵ0. 
 
Again, if somebody asserted [15] and in the same act rejected [18],  
 
[18] There are ways of preparing duck not apt for beginners, 
 
we would be entitled to accuse the person of pragmatic inconsistency. 
Do these inferences force us to assume water, transfinite numbers, and 
ways of preparing duck as primitive objects in the physical universe? The 
Fregean analysis of existence shows that they do not. A quite standard reaction 
to the question that starts this paragraph is that the three inferences are of a 
very different nature —that is, that the assertion of [13] commits us to 
accepting the existence of water, but that this is not so in the other two cases. 
This answer is misleading, and the recourse to the idea of a canonic language in 
which ontological commitments are perspicuous and/or to the procedure of 
rephrasing ⎯the standard Quinean answers⎯ is begging the question. To give 
an appropriate explanation, two aspects should be distinguished: the first one 
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has to do with the inferential connections between these three pairs of 
propositions, [13] to [16], [14] to [17], and [15] to [18]. The rule of existential 
generalization, the rule that supports the transitions from [13], [14], and [15] to 
[16], [17], and [18], respectively, is an essential feature of the semantic 
behaviour of the concept of existence. Existence, as a higher-order notion, 
expresses some property of concepts, in this case that they are not empty. By 
[13], we say that the concept “Martian water” is not empty, by [14] we say the 
concept “transfinite number greater than ℵ0” is not empty and by [15] we say 
that the concept “a novice cook capable of preparing Peking duck” is empty. 
The further inference that, in order to assert existence, some kind of causal 
connection to “reality” should be established is tantamount to requiring that 
extensions of concepts always consist of physical objects. Reductionist object 
naturalism regards all concepts as first-order concepts encoding physical 
properties. 
The second aspect is related to the circumstances under which we are 
entitled to assert [13]-[10]. To be in a position to assert [16], we should have 
some kind of causal link, even if indirect, to samples of H2O. The required 
connection is provided by the assertion circumstances of [13]. However, the 
requirement of the causal link is independent of the meaning of existence; it 
depends on the empirical status of the kind of discourse to which [13] belongs. 
Nevertheless, conceptual instantiation takes place in any kind of discourse, 
regardless of its subject matter. Properties of physical objects are instantiated 
by physical objects, whereas properties of abstract objects are instantiated by 
abstract objects. The inferential import of the existential higher-order concept 
forces us to accept [17] when we accept [14], and to accept [18] when we 
accept [15]. Otherwise our use of the notions involved would be sui-generis. 
The differences between [13], [14], and [15] rest on the different 
assertion criteria fitting the kind of discourse to which they belong. To assert 
[14] we should have some kind of proof. But once we have it, if the proof 
supports our assertion of [14], it necessarily has to support our assertion of 
[17]. The kinds of criteria that entitle us to assert [14] are not the kinds of 
criteria on which we rely in order to assert [15]. Be that as it may, however, 
once we are entitled to assert [15], we have all we need to assert [18].  
Placement problems make sense related to the instantiation of first-
order concepts on physical objects. Its extension to cover any kind of concept 
is a reductionist move that finds no support in our best theoretical treatment 
of existence, which is the Fregean account. 
María José Frápolli 
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Non-reductionist object naturalism, the theoretical position that 
includes philosophy in the web of knowledge, and subject naturalism, the 
attitude that interprets humans as part of the natural world, are non-
reductionist positions robust enough to support a theoretical treatment of the 
concepts we use. Subject naturalism also explains the powerful intuitions 
behind default realism, default representationalism, and default 
correspondentism. Animals as we are, our nature entitles us to master language 
in all its breath, including abstract discourse on non-physical entities and 
higher-order concepts. 
 
María José Frápolli 
University of Granada/University College London 
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